L Introduction
More than eighty-five years ago the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of Indian reserved water rights in Winters v. United States. ' The Winters Court held that the United States, in creating the Fort Belknap Indian reservation, implicitly reserved river water flowing through and adjacent to the reservation "for a use which would be necessarily continued through years." 2 The Court further held that the reserved water was exempt from state prior appropriation water laws?
The scope of the "Winters doctrine" was necessarily limited to surface waters by the facts of the case. However, the Winters doctrine has been expanded tremendously from a simple Indian water rights case to a complex doctrine applicable to all federally reserved land. 4 This comment addresses one aspect of the doctrine: the treatment of groundwater in relation to the Indian reserved water right?
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the issue of whether the reserved water right of Indian reservations is applicable to groundwater. Legal commentators disagree on the issue. A number of federal and state courts recognize that Indian reserved water rights extend to groundwater. An equally divided Supreme Court, however, affirmed without opinion a Wyoming Supreme Court decision that held there was no intent by the United States to reserve groundwater rights for the Wind River Indian Reservation. 6 Congress, pressure." The greater-than-atmospheric pressure is generated when overlying and underlying impermeable strata compress the aquifer."
'Most aquifers are unconfined, existing under normal atmospheric pressure. 3 Unconfined aquifers must be pumped to withdraw the groundwater."' The rate of displaced groundwater being replaced by the hydrological cycle varies greatly according to permeability of the formation and geological conditions. 5 Some aquifers are functionally nonrecharging because it takes decades or centuries for pumped groundwater to be replaced. 6 For example, many groundwater aquifers in New Mexico are functionally nonrecharging, and they are administered with the understanding that they will be depleted in he future. ' Aquifers undergo depletion, also referred to as overdrafts or mining, when groundwater is withdrawn at a rate greater than its rate of recharging. 8 The "saFe yield" of an aquifer is the amount of groundwater an aquifer will yield without overdraft. 9 For example, many groundwater aquifers in North
Dakota recharge regularly, allowing those groundwater systems to be managed on a "safe yield" basis.'
C. Inadequate Geohydrologic Data
One problem in administering groundwater rights is the problem of locating and accurately quantifying aquifers. The Supreme Court of Ohio aptly stated the problem in 1861: mhe existence, origin, movement and course of [groundwaters] , and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult and concealed, that an attempt to administer any set 11. CORKER, supra note 8, at 68-75. 17. SMITH, supra note 8, at 10. Dean Meyers cites the Ogallala aquifer as "a well-known example of a functionally non-recharging aquifer." Meyers, supra note 16, at 382. The Ogallala aquifer covers an area of 225,000 miles, underlying portions of New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Kan;sas, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, and South Dakota. SMITH, supra note 8, at 14-15. The impact of overdrafts varies significantly region to region. Id.; see also Steve Frazier & Brenton R. Schlender, Huge Area in Midwest Relying on Irrigation Is Depleting Its Water, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 6 (reporting that water is being withdrawn from some parts of the Ogallala aquifer at 15 to 18 times faster than it can be recharged).
18. CORKER, supra note 8, at 75-78, 96-97; GErCHEs, supra note 4, at 239; SMrriH, supra note 8, at 5.
19. CORKER, supra note 8, at 75-78, 96-97; GErcHES, supra note 4, at 239. 20. SMrrH, supra note 8, at 10.
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Geohydrology has made tremendous strides in measuring and tracking groundwater since 1861, but it remains a significant problem.' For example, hydrologists such as Corker and Crosby have noted at least five variables in measuring an aquifer: (1) total quantity of water in the aquifer; (2) the rate of recharge; (3) the changing quality of the available groundwater; (4) the effect of withdrawals on groundwater levels and withdrawal capabilities; and (5) the effect of groundwater withdrawal on surface water supplies.' It is an arduous and expensive task for courts and water supply administrators to obtain the necessary geohydrologic data to make informed decisions about the supply and movement of groundwater." For instance, one major obstacle is detecting and proving overdrafts. The inadequacy of data becomes critical when a party has to shoulder the burden of proof to assert a groundwater right in litigation.'
D. Hydrologically Connected Ground and Surface Waters
As noted previously, groundwater and surface waters frequently interrelate: Groundwaters can feed surface streams, while surface waters can connect to and charge aquifers.' This becomes a cause for concern when groundwater users tap into an aquifer that supplies connected surface waters because the depletion of the aquifer could reduce the flow of the surface water.' Hydrologists and water law commentators advocate managing hydrologically connected ground and surface waters as a single, integrated system since the connected waters actually constitute one water supply. ' Initially, some hydrologists theorized that groundwater was separate and unrelated to surface waters." Based on this inaccuracy, many states created separate legal systems for groundwater and surface waters." Uncertainty and confusion resulted when state economies "developed in reliance on two 21 different legal systems for one interrelated supply" of water. 3 Arid western states, such as Colorado and New Mexico, had great difficulty in converting from bifurcated to integrated surface water and groundwater legal systems. 32 Recognizing the "need for integration" of water law systems, the National Water Commission recommended:
Recommendation No 7-1: State laws should recognize and take account of the substantial interrelation of surface water and ground water. Rights in both sources of supply should be integrated, and uses should be administered and managed conjunctively. There should not be separate codifications of surface water law and ground water law; the law of waters should be a single, integrated body of jurisprudence. Hence, a prudent interpretation of the Indian reserved water right would apply the doctrine uniformly to ground and surface waters. A few states, however, such as Arizona, continue to have bifurcated legal systems for ground and suiface waters.
E. The Importance of Groundwater
Groundwater has become a vital natural resource for the United States, especially for ard western states. It has been estimated that groundwater constitutes more than 90% of the fresh water supply in the United States. ' Groundwater use more than quadrupled from 21 billion to 88 billion gallons a day from 1945 to 1980." 5 Groundwater is relied upon nationally for 35% of the public water system supply; 80% of the water consumed for rural domestic and livestock purposes; 40% of the irrigated agriculture water; and 6% of the self-supplied industrial water.' Groundwater comprises 38% of the total water used in the nineteen western states, 3 " of which: 8% is used in public water systems; 2% for rural domestic and livestock purposes; 82% for irrigated agriculture; and 8% for self-supplied industrial use." 31. Id Groundwater has always been important to the settlement of the West.
Early western settlers relied on windmill pumps to provide enough water for domestic use. 9 Technological advances in the centrifugal pump and irrigation systems dramatically increased the reliance of western state economies on groundwater for mineral mining and irrigated agriculture."
The demands of growing populations will only increase the importance of groundwater in western state economies.
III. Water Rights Legal Systems
States have adopted different approaches to assigning water rights. These differing approaches become very confusing in states that bifurcate ground and surface water in their legal systems. Three major water rights legal doctrines have developed in Anglo-American jurisprudence: riparian, prior appropriation, and correlative rights.
A. Riparian Doctrine
The common law rule, as it developed in England, is the doctrine of absolute ownership of water rights' Under this doctrine, water rights run with the land. The owner of land has property rights to the water under the land and, absent malice, the water may be withdrawn without regard to the effect it has on other landowners. 43 American courts, particularly those in water-rich eastern states, widely adopted the riparian rights doctrine, but they modified it to enlarge the use restriction from malice to unreasonable use." Thus, under the American riparian doctrine, water rights are part of the real property right with the restriction that the landowner has the right of reasonable use under the circumstances of supply and demand.
B. Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The prior appropriation doctrine was developed by western states, where ' The doctrine severs the water right from running with the land. The one who puts water to a beneficial use, whether or not he or sh , .. owns the connected land, has a right that is superior to that of later users from the same water source. 47 The prior appropriation doctrine developed as a practical and efficient means of dealing with a scarce and vital natural resource. Additionally, the doctrine encouraged economic development in the West since users risked the loss of their water rights if they failed to exercise them.
The prior appropriation doctrine developed in response to surface water conflicts and, in those states with unified systems, the doctrine carried over basically unchanged to groundwater. One recent development, however, is that many states regulate groundwater use and attempt to protect prior appropriations through groundwater use permits." Many western states have statutes setting reasonable pumping levels for all or parts of a state'
States with bifurcated groundwater and surface water legal systems sometimes apply different water rights doctrines to groundwater and surface water. Arizona, for example, applies riparian rights to groundwater and the prior appropriation doctrine to surface water.
C. Correlative Rights Doctrine
The correlative rights doctrine is a hybrid system of riparianism and prior appropriation that was developed initially by the California courts. States following the correlative rights doctrine usually have complex rules applying a combination of the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines to a variety of situations.' An application of the "California doctrine" is found in the wellknown case of Lux v. Haggin. 5 In Lux, the California Supreme Court held that a person acquiring federal lands received riparian rights by virtue of his foderal fee-patent but these rights were subject to prior appropriations existing on the public land or permitted by special legislation. ' The correlative rights doctrine, as generally applied to groundwater, preserves the landowner's right to use the water under his or her property but provides that landowners sharing a common source of groundwater have equal rights to a reasonable amount of water. 3 The correlative rights doctrine in The federal-tribal relationship is premised upon broad but not unlimited federal constitutional power over Indian affairs, often described as "plenary." The relationship is also distinguished by special trust obligations requiring the United States to adhere strictly to fiduciary standards in its dealings with Indians. The inherent tension between broad federal authority and special federal trust obligations has produced a unique body of law. The history of United States national policy toward Indians is marked by erratic pendular swings from one polar extreme to the other. The national policy positions can be categorized into distinct time periods.' The "formative years" encompass 1789 to 1871." Initially, European-American settlers treated Indian tribes as quasi-independent nations that could be placated through treaties. It was through these treaties that many of the current reservations were created. As the United States consolidated control over its territory and the expansion to the West and South became national policy, Congress adopted a policy of abandoning formal treaty making. ' Federal policy dramatically shifted to "allotment and assimilation" during the years 1871 to 1928.6 Under this policy, Indian "civilization" and assimilation into American society was the goal. The Allotment Acte was the primary means of accomplishing this policy by encouraging the 54 ' The goal of the termination policy was to destroy the communal lifestyle and sovereignty of certain enumerated tribes and to bring Indians under the jurisdiction of the states as assimilated, selfsufficient individuals. 70 Indian lands were allowed to pass to non-Indians, tribal economic development was ignored, and Indian relocation into urban areas was encouraged. 7! '
The present era began in 1961 with the current federal policy of "selfdetermination" for Indian tribes.' Congress unofficially abandoned the termination policy in 1958, and during the 1960 presidential election the platforms of both Richard Nixon and John Kennedy supported changing federal Indian policy.' President Nixon set forth the current federal policy in 1970, declaring termination to have been a failure and urging Congress to adopt a new policy of tribal autonomy combined with the federal trust 63. COHEN, supra note 55, at 130-31. The allotment policy had the effect of "checkerboarding" Indian reservations with Indian and non-Indian-held land. Non-Indian-held land within Indian reservation boundaries has complicated jurisdictional lines between tribal, state, and federal courts. 
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relationship.' The self-determination policy is based on Indian tribes acting as the basic governing body for Indians, with the federal government performing a strong trustee role." A congressional commission, the American Indian Policy Review Commission, was established in 1975 "to conduct a comprehensive review of the historical and legal developments underlying the Indians' unique relationship with the Federal Government in order to determine the nature and scope of necessary revisions in the formulation of policies and programs for the benefit of Indians." 6 Among other things, the Commission's 1977 report called for a repudiation of assimilationist policies and recognition of tribes as permanent, self-governing entities." Subsequent to the commission's report, congressional and executive policies have favored tribal self-government.' Congress has failed, however, to repeal many laws enacted in the allotment and termination eras, which has led to judicial decisions contrary to current federal policy. ' In the turmoil of these dramatic executive branch and legislative policy shifts, the special trust relationship of the federal government toward Indians mhe tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence. Id. at 590. Chief Justice Marshall apparently changed his view of Indian rights when he wrote the Worcester v. Georgia decision in 1832:
America ... was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the
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Published The President and Congress adopted the special federal trust relationship to Indians as official policy during the selfdetermination era.
The Supreme Court recognizes, under the trust doctrine, that Congress has broad leeway in exercising its plenary power:
In Morton v. Mancari the Supreme Court stated: "As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed."
Although the Court has never spoken directly to the issue, the requirement of a rational tie between an Indian statute and the fulfillment of the trust relationship seems to impose substantive limitations on Congress. This standard, in practice, does not allow a reviewing court to second guess a particular determination by Congress that a statute is an appropriate protection of the Indians' interests.'
But the Supreme Court liberally construes statutes, treaties, agreements, and executive orders as creating Indian rights. ' Furthermore, once Indian rights are shown to exist, the Supreme Court requires a "clear and plain" expression of congressional intent to abrogate them. ' For example, in a treaty establishing an Indian reservation the Court will construe congressional silence on water rights as creating, by implication, Indian rights to water. Once established, the right can only be taken away by a "clear and plain" statement of Congress to that effect.
The federal government, however, has a long history of being grossly remiss in securing, protecting, and developing adequate water supplies for Indian reiervations. As stated in Cohen: discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832) (holding that a state law regulating the Cherokee territory was superseded by United States laws and treaties designed to protect the right of self-government by Indian tribes); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1331) (holding that Indian tribes are not "foreign states" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution). One could speculate that Chief Justice Marshall's changed perspective was a result of the lapse in time. Perhaps ' the Gila River tribes claimed the United States breached its fiduciary duty by permitting groundwater mining adjacent to the reservation. The court noted that in settling the water rights claims of the Ak-Chin Indian community, Congress admitted that "it is likely that the United States would be held liable for its failure to provide water and for allowing ground water beneath the reservation to be mined."" Then, the court stated:
Ground water under the Gila River reservation impliedly was reserved for the Indians. The special relationship that triggers the fair and honorable dealings standard obligates the United States to protect the ground water to the extent that it is needed as a supplement to surface water supplies to maintain a self-sufficient status from irrigated agriculture. This special relationship, however, did not create a right in plaintiffs to have the United States obligated to protect and preserve for them all of the ground water under the reservation .... Plaintiffs The court held the Gila River tribes failed to meet their burden of proof; to date, no tribe has successfully asserted a groundwater claim against the United States under this trust relationship standard.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Indian Treaties and Agreements
Treaties and agreements creating Indian reservations were drafted by the United States and agreed to by Indians who usually neither spoke nor read English. The Supreme Court has been suspect of the fairness of these treaties and agreements given the circumstances under which they were negotiated.
Central to the Supreme Court's federal trust doctrine are special canons of construction that the Court developed for interpreting treaties and agreements between Indians and the United States government.' Three primary canons of construction have been developed: (1) interpreting the agreement or treaty as the Indians themselves would have understood it; (2) resolving ambiguities in the documents in favor of the Indians;" and (3) liberally construing the treaties or agreements in favor of the Indians." Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress must show a "clear and plain" intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights.'
C. Federal Conflict with State Prior Appropriation Laws
The Winters doctrine resulted from a conflict over the application of state prior appropriation laws to federally held lands. Prior to the Winters decision Congress recognized the validity of several states' prior appropriation doctrine, and it had adopted a policy of deferring to local water laws." In conflict with this policy was congressional reservation of lands for Indians by way of agreements and treaties: Would non-Indians, who were usually more economically developed than the Indians, be permitted to appropriate unused water adjacent to Indian reservations?
As noted in the introduction, the Winters doctrine established that Congress must have implicitly intended to reserve water rights in connection with lands set aside for Indian reservations. of water rights between reservation Indians and non-Indians who owned lands ceded by the Indians to the federal government." The non-Indians had made a substantial economic investment in diverting Milk River water for irrigated agriculture, thereby depriving the downstream Fort Belknap Indian Reservation of most of the Milk River water. The non-Indians claimed that the reservation was entitled to only 250 inches of water, since that was the amount of the Milk River water used by the reservation prior to the irrigation project.
The Supreme Court stated, "The case, as we view it, turns on the agreement of May, 1888, resulting in the creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation." ' The agreement'" was silent on the issue of water rights, so the Court turned to the canons of construction. The Court concluded that in making the agreement the Indians would have realized the need for water and would have reserved the use of the Milk River."' Thus, reserved water on Indian reservations were exempted from the prior appropriation laws of the states.'12
The Court rationalized its decision by noting that the purpose of creating the reservations was to transform the Indian peoples from nomadic hunters and gatherers to a pastoral people." Thus, the Court stated,
[I]t would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren waste -took from them the means of continuing their old habits, yet did not leave them the power to change to new ones."
The Winters doctrine as it applies to Indian reservations has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions." The Winters doctrine, however, has an uncertain future as evidenced during oral arguments in the Big Horn case, when Supreme Court members questioned the continued validity of the reserved water rights doctrine.'" 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994 In Winters, the Supreme Court was very ambiguous in defining the scope of the reserved water right, using the phrase "for a use which would be necessarily continued through years."'" The open-ended reserved water right created by Winters undermined the prior appropriation doctrine by destroying the certainty that the doctrine brought to water rights in the West. For example, how could a non-Indian community or company invest in a project if it had no future guarantee of having the amount of water secured under the prior appropriation doctrine? The conflict is fundamental.
The Winters doctrine was slow to develop, due in part to the federal government's failure in its duty to protect the Indian water rights interest1 0 8 FCr example, the Department of Interior, which includes the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was given a conflicting duty under the Reclamation Act of 1902 "to locate, construct, operate and maintain works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters for the reclamation of ard and semi-arid land in the West.'"" In its report, the National Water Commission stated:
Following Winters, more than 50 years elapsed before the Supreme Court again discussed significant aspects of Indian water rights. During most of this 50-year period, the United States was pursuing a policy of encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little or no regard for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine. With the encouragement, or at least the cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior -the very office entrusted with protection of all Indian rights -many large irrigation projects were constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often below the Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were planned and built by the Federal Government without any attempt to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the projects." 0 4 In Arizona, the special master, who was appointed by the district court to conduct a lengthy trial and report on his findings, quantified the Indian reservation water needs according to the amount of water necessary to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservation." 5 Thus, out of a supply of an estimated 7,500,000 acre-feet of water," ' 6 the special master reserved 1,000,000 acre-feet of water for 135,000 practicably irrigable acres of reservation land." 7 The Supreme Court agreed with this portion of the Special Master's report, stating:
We have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage. The various acreages of irrigable land which the Master found to be on the different reservations we find to be reasonable." 8 The practicably irrigable acreage (hereinafter PIA) standard is based on an agricultural use of the land, which assumes that agriculture was the intended and all non-Indians of the State of Washington allocating to Indians 25% of the Ahtanum Creek waters and 75% to non-Indian settlers, but ordering the return to the Indians any unused portion of the 75% grant to non-Indians); The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted in Colorado River, allows and encourages state courts to undertake the task of quantifying Indian water rights in the course of comprehensive water adjudications. Although adjudication of those rights in federal court instead might in the abstract be practical, and even wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property rights.' 35 After Colorado River and Arizona, the federal courts have, for the most part, withdrawn from Indian reserved water rights cases and deferred to state courts which have undertaken comprehensive adjudication of water rights. 36 Groundwater issues would appear to fall within the plain language of the McCarran Amendment, which confers jurisdiction to adjudicate water rights "of a river system or other source.""' j3 In short, the determination of whether Effective management in the public interest of the waters of the Snake River basin requires that a comprehensive determination of the nature, extent and priority of the rights of all users of surface and ground water from that system be determined. Therefore, the director of the department of water resources shall petition the district court to commence an adjudication within the terms of the McCarran amendment, 43 U.S.C. section 666 .... The "filing fees" the state seeks to charge the United States are not the usual modest fees for filing pleadings in a lawsuit. The "filing fees" at issue here exceed TEN MILLION DOLLARS! Of this amount, eight and one-half million dollars represent "filing fees" for the adjudication of "reserved" rights .... 142 The 142. hI re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 832 P.2d 289, 300 (Idaho 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting). The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "reserved" rights generally "consist of those rights reserved by treaty with the Indians." Id. at 293. 143. United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. at 1897.
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V. The Groundwater Loophole
As noted at the outset, the issue of whether the reserved water right of Indian reservations applies to groundwater has never been directly decided by the Supreme Court. This "loophole" in Indian reserved water rights, however, has been addressed by a number of federal and state courts.
A. Federal Cases
The first federal cases applying the Winters doctrine to groundwater concerned land reserved for military installations. In United States v. Fallbrook Public Utility District,'" the district court recognized, in accord with California law . regarding interrelated waters, that groundwaters hydrologically connected to surface waters were part of the federal reserved water right attached to the Camp Pendleton military base.' State ex rel. Shamberger v. United States'" held that the federal government could use underground or percolating waters located under land reserved for the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot without obtaining permission from the State of Nevada.
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In the first case examining the issue of groundwater rights within an Indian reservation, the Montana district court in Tweedy v. Texas Co.' stated in dicta, "The Winters case dealt only with the surface water, but the same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that surface waters had been reserved would apply to underground waters as well.'. 49 In Tweedy, the court denied recovery to the Blackfeet Indians, due to a lack of proof, against an oil and gas lessee who used groundwater underlying non-Indian surface owners' lands within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana. ' The Supreme Court appeared to settle by implication the Indian reserved groundwater rights issue in Cappaert v. United States,"' although the case did not deal with an Indian reservation. At issue in Cappaert was the reserved water right for Devil's Hole National Monument, which was established by Congress in 1952 to preserve a unique desert pupfish found in a subterranean pool.'" The Cappaerts began pumping groundwater for irrigation under a State of Nevada permit, thereby causing a decrease in the water level of the [Vol. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/4 COMMENTS pupfish pool." The Supreme Court upheld a permanent injunction granted to the United States to stop the Cappaerts' pumping.'" In upholding the permanent injunction, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court, "[S]ince the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold that the United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater." 55 In United States v. Bel Bay Community & Water Association," the district court granted the Lummi Tribe partial summary judgment on the issue of the tribe's power to regulate groundwater under non-Indian held land within the external boundaries of the Lummi Indian Reservation.'" Later in the case, however, the district court reversed itself due to concerns about tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. ' The dispute in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton" concerned the Colville Indian Reservation's rights to water from No Name Creek, which was found to be hydrologically connected to an underlying aquifer."° The tribe brought suit in 1970 to enjoin the non-Indian owners of allotted lands within the reservation from using No Name Creek water reserved to the tribe.' The district court held that the Indian reserved water right was limited to Indians and did not pass to non-Indians with the title to alienated Indian lands." Additionally, the district court relied on Cappaert in holding that Indian reserved water rights extended to groundwater."
In United States v. Anderson,' a district court recognized that the Spokane Tribe of Indians had a reserved right to groundwater in the Chamokane water basin located in the northeastern part of Washington. ' The United States filed suit in 1972 for a water rights adjudication of the Chamokane water basin on behalf of the Spokane Tribe." 6 After extensive proceedings the court determined that portions of the Chamokane Creek were interrelated with groundwater aquifers and that groundwater withdrawals by the tribe in the Mid-Chamokane area reduced the water flow downstream. 67 The tribe, which intervened in the action, obtained quantified amounts of groundwater and surface water for fishing and agricultural irrigati6n.'" The quantified amount is subject to future modification if the tribe shows a "substantial change in circumstances" resulting in a greater water need for the tribe to meet the "primary purposes for creating the reservation."'" 9 The district court also held that the tribe could transfer reserved water quantified for irrigation to fishing uses."' As discussed earlier, the United States Claims Court stated in Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States"' that the Gila River tribes had a reserved groundwater right to the extent that the tribes could beneficially use the water."
Thus, the Supreme Court implied in Cappaert, and several lower federal courts have held, that the Indian reserved water right extends to groundwater.
B. Disagreement of Legal Commentators
Many legal commentators assumed that Cappaert was a de facto determination of the issue of Indian groundwater rights.' The logical assumption of these legal commentators is that just as the federal reserved water right of Indians carried over to other federal enclaves, the extension of the: federal reserved right to groundwater in a non-Indian case (Cappaert) would carry back to Indian reservations. Certainly one could presume the Supreme Court would recognize a groundwater right for Indian reservations 166 Early readings of Cappaert led me to believe that just as Indian water rights under Winters provided the foundation for federal reserved water rights on non-Indian reservations, federal groundwater rights on a National Monument under Cappaert would provide the basis for Indian groundwater rights.
I no longer hold that view. I would argue that when an Indian Reservation was created, whether by treaty, statute or executive order, a property interest comparable to a fee simple absolute was set aside in trust for the tribe. The Indians own the beneficial interest in all the resources on their land: soil, oil and gas, coal, other minerals and groundwater."
Dean Meyers favors treating groundwater as a property interest because it eliminates the whole reserved rights problem, which he argues will lead to maximized productivity and equitable distribution of groundwater. 75 However, returning groundwater to the domain of states while reserving surface waters would create a bifurcated Indian water rights system, which would muddle water disputes where surface water and groundwater are interconnected. Efficient water management with equitable water distribution will result only when legal systems treat surface water and groundwater uniformly.
C. State Approaches to Indian Reserved Groundwater Rights
The Colorado River decision resulted in a proliferation of water rights litigation in the western states." 7 6 This section will examine a cursory sampling of the state approaches to Indian reserved water rights. The states examined are Arizona, Montana, and Wyoming. as well as the constitutionality of the proceedings under the due process clause.' The Superior Court then made some preliminary determinations on the relationship between surface water and groundwater to narrow the issues presented in the general adjudication."
9 Arizona is one of the few western states to adhere to a bifurcated system of water rights, whereby the prior appropriation doctrine applies to surface waters and groundwater belongs to the overlying landowner as limited by the doctrine of reasonable use." To further complicate Arizona's water rights doctrine, the Arizona Supreme Court deems appropriable groundwater pumping that draws appreciably from the flow of surface water."s The Superior Court in Gila River created a test, which it acknowledged was arbitrary, for determining when groundwater becomes appropriable due to pumping that appreciably diminishes the flow of the surface water.' 95 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that "any appropriate
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change in existing law must come from the legislature.""' t The court then stated:
In this field, we not only confer private rights and interests but deal in the very survival of our society and its economy. Simply put, there is not enough water to go around. All must compromise and some must sacrifice. Definition of those boundaries is peculiarly a function for the legislature. It is plainly not a judicial task. Accordingly, we must look to the legislature to enact laws they deem appropriate for wise use and management.'"
The Arizona Supreme Court did, however, find enough judicial discretion to overrule the objections of the United States and the tribes regarding the Superior Caurt's decision to exclude from the "comprehensive" adjudication wells having a de minimis effect on the water system." Thus, well owners pumping de minimis amounts were granted "summary adjudication" of their groundwater rights. 1 " Absent a legislative change to Arizona's bifurcated water system, the groundwater rights of Indian reservations will not be subject to the prior appropriation doctrine. Of course, hydrologically connected surface water and groundwater are syphoned off each other when pumped or appropriated."w As a result, the Gila River tribes could end up gaining or losing substantial quantities of water where the Gila River waters are hydrologically connected to groundwaters. For example, de minimis groundwater pumping could substantially affect-surface water quantities when taken as a whole, or the appropriation of Gila River water feeding reservation aquifers could end up depleting those aquifers.
Congress also has been active in settling Indian water rights in Arizona to end water rights litigation. In 1978 Congress ratified an agreement settling the water right claims of the Ak-Chin Indian community against the United States.' In the agreement, the United States admits failing to fulfill its trust obligations to the tribe by "allowing ground water beneath the reservation to be mined." In exchange for the tribes waiving all water rights claims, the United States agreed to construct "a well field and water delivery system from that it would have excluded most hydrologically connected groundwater underlying the Indian reservation from the prior appropriation doctrine. 
Montana
There are seven Indian reservations in Montana with tribal reserved water rights claims on the Big Horn River and Tongue River in Yellowstone Basin, the Milk and St. Mary river systems, the Big Muddy and Poplar river systems, the tributaries of the Missouri River, the Flathead River system, the Marias River system, Flathead Lake with the Flathead River system, and the Kootenai River.' The seven Indian reservations are of considerable size, and "the potential amount of water reserved is tremendous." ' In the Water Use Act of 1973,2"0 the Montana legislature declared all waters within the state to be the property of the state and subject to appropriation for beneficial use. 
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Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that Indian reserved water rights did not include groundwater.' 7 It so held, in spite of admitting:
The logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater. Certainly the two sources are often interconnected. See § 41-3-916, W.S. 1977 (where underground and surface waters are "so interconnected as to constitute in fact one source of supply," a single schedule of priorities shall be made),' Nonetheless, the court reasoned that it would not recognize an Indian reserved groundwater right in the absence of other cases directly applying the Indian reserved water rights doctrine to groundwater.
" 49 Then, the court stated, "The State has not appealed the decision that the Tribes may continue to satisfy their domestic and livestock needs (part of the agricultural award) from existing wells at current withdrawal rates; therefore, we do not address that question." ' Thus, the court affirmed the district court's holding that rejected the inclusion of groundwater in the Indian reserved water right, yet which awarded the Indians priority rights to current groundwater withdrawal rates.
An equally divided Supreme Court"' affirmed without a written opinion m '
Apparently, the groundwater right issue was not raised on appeals 3 and there apparently was no mention of reserved groundwater rights during oral arguments?" Thus, the Supreme Court's evenly divided affirmation of Big Horn provides no insight into the issues of Indian reserved groundwater rights.
VI. Settlements of Indian Water Claims
The most logical and efficient approach to Indian surface water and groundwater rights claims is through negotiated settlement. As noted by Professor David H. Getches: rejected the relevance of the tribes' use of water for mineral and industrial purposes since the 1868 treaty. Id. at 98. The word "hunting" in Indian treaties, in accord with the canons of construction, has been construed to include fishing. State v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386 (Idaho 1972 Many tribal leaders maintain that water rights are critical for developing tribal economies and preserving cultural identities. Tribal leaders who decide to negotiate sometimes face criticisms that they are "selling out," ' or are negotiating another bad deal for the tribe. These inferences are often justified in light of the legacy of state and federal governments in fashioning inequitable agreements and reneging on past promise.
The prospects of "success" for Indian tribes through litigation have decreased with the Colorado River, Arizona, and Big Horn decisions. Some tribes have chosen to negotiate rather than risk litigating the applicability of the Winters doctrine to groundwater.' Also, tribes have shied away from litigating the groundwater issue because of the expense of collecting adequate groundwater data. 9 The threat of litigation, however, remains a substantial bargaining chip of tribes in settlement negotiations. Additionally, comprehensive federal and state economic development packages for tribes can result from negotiated settlements. Therefore, the gains resulting from , 1986) . Zah, Chairman of the Navajo Nation, notes that the decision to negotiate water rights is a decision for each tribe to make, and he expresses a concern that a single federal policy of negotiation compromises tribal bargaining power. Id.
266. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 257, at 832. 267. Thorson 
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